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Abstract
Consider a competitive \spectrum economy" in communication system where multiple users
share a common frequency band and each of them, equipped with an endowed \monetary"
budget, will \purchase" its own transmit power spectra (taking others as given) in maximizing
its Shannon utility or pay-o® function that includes the e®ects of interference and subjects to
its budget constraint. A market equilibrium is a price spectra and a frequency power allocation
that independently and simultaneously maximizes each user's utility. Furthermore, under an
equilibrium the market clears, meaning that the total power demand equals the power supply
for every user and every frequency. We prove that such an equilibrium always exists for a
discretized version of the problem, and, under a weak-interference condition or the Frequency
Division Multiple Access (FMDA) policy, the equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
This model may lead to an e±cient decentralized method for spectrum allocation management
and optimization in achieving both higher social utilization and better individual satisfaction.
Furthermore, we consider a trading market among individual users to exchange their endowed
power spectra under a price mechanism, and show that the market price equilibrium also exists
and it may lead to a more socially desired spectrum allocation.
1 Introduction
Consider a communication system where multiple users share a common frequency band such as
cognitive radio (e.g., [15]) or Digital Subscribe Lines (DSL, e.g., [23]), where interference mitigation
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ference is to divide the available spectrum into multiple tones (or bands) and pre-assign them to
the users on a non-overlapping basis, called Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) policy.
Although such approach is well-suited for high speed structured communication in which quality
of service is a major concern, it can lead to high system overhead and low bandwidth utilization.
With the proliferation of various radio devices and services, multiple wireless systems sharing a
common spectrum must coexist [15], and we are naturally led to a situation whereby users can
dynamically adjust their transmit power spectral densities over the entire shared spectrum, poten-
tially achieving signi¯cantly higher overall throughput and fairness. For such a multi-user system,
each user's performance, measured by a Shannon utility function, depends on not only the power
allocation (across spectrum) of its own, but also those of other users in the system.
Thus, the dynamic spectrum management problem has recently become a topic of intensive
research in the signal processing and digital communication community. From the optimization
perspective, the problem solution can be formulated either as a noncooperative Nash game ([7,
28, 25, 18]); or as a cooperative utility maximization problem ([3, 30]). Several algorithms were
proposed to compute a Nash equilibrium solution (Iterative Water¯lling method (IWFA) [7, 28]);
or globally optimal power allocations (Dual decomposition method ([4, 17, 29]) for the cooperative
game. Due to the problems nonconvex nature, these algorithms either lack global convergence or
may converge to a poor spectrum sharing strategy.
In an attempt to analyze the performance of the dual decomposition algorithms, Yu and
Lui [29] studied the duality gap of the continuous sum-rate maximization problem and showed
it to be zero in the general frequency selective case based on engineering intuition. In two recent
papers [19, 20], Luo and Zhang presented a systematic study of the dynamic spectrum management
problem, covering two key theoretical aspects: complexity and duality. Speci¯cally, they determined
the complexity status of the spectrum management problem under various practical settings as
well as di®erent choices of system utility functions, and identify subclasses which are polynomial
time solvable. In so doing, they clearly delineated the set of computationally tractable problems
within the general class of NP-hard spectrum management problems. Furthermore, they rigorously
established the zero-duality gap result of Yu and Lui for the continuous formulation when the
interference channels are frequency selective. The asymptotic strong zero duality result of [19, 20]
suggests that the Lagrangian dual decomposition approach ([4, 17, 29]) may be a viable way to
2reach approximate optimality for ¯nely discretized spectrum management problems. In fact, when
restricted to the FDMA policy, they showed that the Lagrangian dual relaxation, combined with
a linear programming scheme, could generate an ²-optimal solution for the continuous formulation
of the spectrum management problem in polynomial time for any ¯xed ² > 0.
Besides computational di±culty, there remain other issues in the Nash equilibrium or the
aggregate social utility maximization model. The Nash equilibrium solution may not achieve social
communication economic e±ciency; and, on the other hand, an aggregate optimal power allocation
may not simultaneously optimizes each user's individual utility. Thus, we naturally turn to a
competitive economy equilibrium solution for dynamic spectrum management, where both social
economic e±ciency and individual optimality could be achieved.
The study of competitive economy equilibria occupies a central place in mathematical eco-
nomics. This study was formally started by Walras [24] over a hundred years ago. In this problem
everyone in a population of n agents has an initial endowment of divisible goods or budget and a
utility function for consuming all goods|their own and others. Every agent sells the entire initial
endowment and then uses the revenue to buy a bundle of goods such that his or her utility function
is maximized (individual optimality) and the market has neither shortage nor surplus (economic
e±ciency). Walras asked whether prices could be set for every good such that this is possible. An
answer was given by Arrow and Debreu in 1954 [1] who showed that such an equilibrium would exist,
under very mild conditions, if the utility functions were concave. Their proof was non-constructive
and did not o®er any algorithm to ¯nd such equilibrium prices.
Fisher was the ¯rst to consider an algorithm to compute equilibrium prices for a related and
di®erent model where agents are divided into two sets: producers and consumers; see Brainard and
Scarf [2, 22]. Consumers spend money only to buy goods and maximize their individual utility
functions of goods; producers sell their goods only for money. An equilibrium is an assignment of
prices to goods so that when every consumer buys a maximal bundle of goods then the market
clears, meaning that all the money is spent and all the goods are sold. Fisher's model is a special
case of Walras' model when money is also considered a good so that Arrow and Debreu's result
applies.
For certain utility functions, the equilibrium problem is actually a social utility maximization
problem. For example, Eisenberg and Gale [12, 14] give a convex programming (or optimization)
3formulation whose solution yields equilibriums for the Fisher market with linear utility functions,
and Eisenberg [13] extended this approach to derive a convex program for general concave and
homogeneous functions of degree 1. Their program consists of maximizing an aggregate social utility
function of all consumers over a convex polyhedron de¯ned by supply-demand linear constraints.
The Lagrange or dual multipliers of these constraints yield equilibrium prices. Thus, ¯nding a
Fisher equilibrium becomes solving a convex optimization problem, and it could be computed by the
Ellipsoid method or by e±cient interior-point methods in polynomial time. Here, polynomial time
means that one can compute an ² approximate equilibrium in a number of arithmetic operations
bounded by polynomial in n and log 1
²; or, if there is a rational equilibrium solution, one can
compute an exact equilibrium in a number of arithmetic operations bounded by polynomial in n
and L, where L is the bit-length of the input data, see, e.g., [16]. When the utility functions are
linear, the current best arithmetic operations complexity bound is O(
p
mn(m + n)3L) given by
[26]. Negative results also obtained for other utilities, see, e.g., Codenotti et al. [27, 8].
However, little is known on the computational complexity for competitive market equilibria
with non-homogeneous utility functions ([6, 11, 5]), or utility functions that include goods purchased
by other agents, which is the case in dynamic spectrum management. In the original paper of Arrow
and Debreu [1], each user's utility function was described as a function of his or her own actions.
Our paper is to study the existence and complexity of an equilibrium point that is characterized
by the property that each individual is maximizing the pay-o® to him or her by controlling his or
her own actions, given the actions of the other agents, over the set of actions permitted him or her
also in view of the other agents' actions.
We prove in this paper that
1. A competitive equilibrium always exists for the communication spectrum market with the
Shannon utility for spectrum users and pro¯t utility for the spectrum power provider.
2. Under an additional weak-interference and ¯xed supply condition, such equilibria form a
convex or log-convex set and one can be computed in polynomial time.
3. Under the FMDA policy, the equilibrium is unique and can be computed in polynomial time.
42 Mathematical Notations
First, a few mathematical notations. Let Rn denote the n-dimensional Euclidean space; Rn
+ denote
the subset of Rn where each coordinate is non-negative. R and R+ denote the set of real numbers
and the set of non-negative real numbers, respectively.
Let X 2 Rmn
+ denote the set of ordered m-tuples X = (x1;:::;xm) and let ¹ Xi 2 R
(m¡1)n
+
denote the set of ordered (m¡1)-tuples X = (x1;:::;xi¡1;xi+1;:::;xm), where xi = (xi1;:::;xin) 2
Xi ½ Rn
+ for i = 1;:::;m. For each i, suppose there is a real utility function ui, de¯ned over X.
Let Ai(¹ xi) be a subset of Xi de¯ning for each point ¹ xi 2 ¹ Xi, Then the sequence
[X1;:::;Xm;u1;:::;um;A1(¹ x1);:::;Am(¹ xm)] will be termed an abstract economy. Here Ai(¹ xi) repre-
sent the feasible action set of agent i that is possibly restricted by the actions of others, such as the
budget restraint that the cost of the goods chosen at current prices not exceed his income, and the
prices and possibly some or all of the components of his income are determined by choices made
by other agents. Similarly, utility function ui(xi; ¹ xi) for agent i depends on his or her actions xi,
as well as actions ¹ xi made by all other agents. Also, denote xj = (x1j;:::;xmj) 2 Rm for a given
x 2 X.
A function u : Rn
+ ! R+ is said to be concave if for any x;y 2 Rn
+ and any 0 · ® · 1, we
have u(®x + (1 ¡ ®)y) ¸ ®u(x) + (1 ¡ ®)u(y); and it is strictly concave if u(®x + (1 ¡ ®)y) >
®u(x) + (1 ¡ ®)u(y) for 0 < ® < 1. It is monotone increasing if for any x;y 2 Rn
+, x ¸ y implies
that u(x) ¸ u(y). It is homogeneous of degree d if for any x 2 Rn
+ and any ® > 0, u(®x) = ®du(x).
3 Competitive Communication Spectrum Market
Let the multi-user communication system consist of m transmitter-receiver pairs sharing a common
frequency band f 2 ­. For simplicity, we will call each of such transmitter-receiver pair a \User".
Upon normalization, we can assume ­ to be the unit interval [0;1]. Each user i will be endowed a
\monetary" budget wi > 0 and use it to \purchase or exchange" for power spectra density, xi(f),
across f 2 ­, from an open market so as to maximize its own utility ui(xi(f 2 ­); ¹ xi(f 2 ­)),
where ¹ xi(f 2 ­) represent power spectra densities obtained by all other users. wi may not represent
real money like a coupon. In some tra±c °ow applications, they represent \toll" budgets for users
to pay toll routs. In other applications, wi simply represents the \importance" weight of certain
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adjust wi to maximize certain aggregate social utility.
There is a second-type agents, called power capacity \Producer or Provider", who installs
power capacity spectra density s(f 2 ­) ¸ 0 to the market from a convex and compact set S to
maximize his or her utility.
The third agent, \Market", sets power spectra unit \price" density p(f 2 ­) ¸ 0. p(f) can be
interpreted as a \preference or ranking" spectra density of f. For example, p(f1) = 1 and p(f2) = 2
simply mean that users can use one unit of s(f2) to trade for two units of s(f1). In tra±c °ow
applications, p(f) represents the toll fee for route f.
Then, User i's(i = 1;:::;m) individual utility maximization problem is
maximize xi(f2­) ui(xi(f 2 ­); ¹ xi(f 2 ­))
subject to
R
­ p(f)xi(f)df · wi
xi(f 2 ­) ¸ 0;
(1)
that is, the total payment of \purchased" power spectral density does not exceed his or her endowed
budget wi.
A commonly recognized utility for user i, i = 1;:::;m, in communication is the Shannon utility
[9]:
ui(xi(f 2 ­); ¹ xi(f 2 ­)) =
Z
­
log
Ã
1 +
xi(f)
¾i(f) +
P
k6=i ai
k(f)xk(f)
!
df (2)
where ¾i(f) denotes the normalized background noise power for user i at frequency f, and ai
k(f) is
the normalized crosstalk ratio from user k to user i at frequency f. Due to normalization we have
ai
i(f) = 1 for all i and f 2 ­. One may also subtract a physical cost of total \purchased" power
spectra density from the Shannon utility:
ui(xi(f 2 ­); ¹ xi(f 2 ­)) =
Z
­
log
Ã
1 +
xi(f)
¾i(f) +
P
k6=i ai
k(f)xk(f)
!
df ¡ ci
Z
­
xi(f)df;
where ci is a constant cost rate for user i.
The power provider's individual utility maximization problem is
maximize s(f2­) us(s(f 2 ­);p(f 2 ­))
subject to s(f 2 ­) 2 S;
(3)
6where us(s(f 2 ­);p(f 2 ­)) represents the utility function of the power capacity provider who
installs s(f 2 ­) and S is a physical feasible set (can be a ¯xed point). For example,
us(s(f 2 ­);p(f 2 ­)) =
Z
­
p(f)s(f)df ¡ c(s(f 2 ­))
that is, the pro¯t made by installing power spectra density s(f) where c(s(f 2 ­)) is a cost function.
A competitive market equilibrium is a density point [x¤
1(f);:::;x¤
m(f););s¤(f);p¤(f)]; f 2 ­
such that
² (User optimality) x¤
i(f 2 ­) is a maximizer of (1) given ¹ x¤
i(f 2 ­) and p¤(f 2 ­) for every i.
² (Producer optimality) s¤(f 2 ­) is a maximizer of (3) given p¤(f 2 ­).
² (Market e±ciency) p(f 2 ­) ¸ 0,
Pm
i=1 x¤
i(f) · s¤(f); p¤(f)(s¤(f) ¡
Pm
i=1 x¤
i(f)) = 0; 8f 2
­.
The last condition says that if power capacity s¤(f) is greater than needed density,
Pm
i=1 x¤
i(f)),
at frequency f, then its equilibrium price density p¤(f) = 0.
We remark that this is a rather arti¯cial exchange or trading open market, where the price p
and budget w do not necessarily have physical interpretations. The meaningful outputs may be only
those power spectra assignments, and w and p are economic mechanisms mainly used to in°uence
users' behavior over the communication channel selection to achieve a larger market utilization.
In reality, the frequency band range ­ is discretized by n tones: ­ = ff1;f2;:::;fng, where the
Shannon utility for user i, i = 1;:::;m, becomes
ui(xi; ¹ xi) =
n X
j=1
log
Ã
1 +
xij
¾ij +
P
k6=i ai
kjxkj
!
(4)
where variable xi = (xi1;:::;xin) 2 Rn
+ and xij is the power units purchased by User i for tone
j, variables in ¹ xi 2 R
(m¡1)n
+ are power units purchased by all other users, parameter ¾ij denotes
the normalized background noise power for user i at tone j, and parameter ai
kj is the normalized
crosstalk ratio from user k to user i at tone j. Due to normalization we have ai
ij = 1 for all i;j.
Clearly, ui(xi; ¹ xi) is a continuous concave and monotone increasing function in xi 2 Rn
+ for every
¹ xi 2 R
(m¡1)n
+ . Again, one may also adjust the utility function to
ui(xi; ¹ xi) =
n X
j=1
log
Ã
1 +
xij
¾ij +
P
k6=i ai
kjxkj
!
¡ ci
0
@
n X
j=1
xij
1
A;
7that is, subtracting a physical cost of total \purchased" tone powers from the Shannon utility.
Then, a competitive communication spectrum market equilibrium is a point of
[x¤
1;:::;x¤
m;s¤;p¤], where s¤ = (s¤
1;:::;s¤
n) 2 Rn
+ and s¤
j is the total power capacity units installed
by the second power provider, and p¤ = (p¤
1;:::;p¤
n) 2 Rn
+ and p¤
j is the unit price for tone j set by
Market; such that
1. (User optimality) x¤
i, i = 1;:::;m, is a maximizer of
maximize xi ui(xi; ¹ x¤
i)
subject to
Pn
j=1 p¤
jxij · wi
xi 2 Xi ½ Rn
+;
(5)
where ¹ x¤
i = [x¤
1;:::;x¤
i¡1;x¤
i+1;:::;x¤
n] and Xi is a physical feasible set. For example,
Xi = fxi 2 Rn
+ :
n X
j=1
xij · big
where bi > 0 is a physical battery power budget for user i.
2. (Producer optimality) s¤ is a maximizer of
maximize s us(s;p¤)
subject to s 2 S ½ Rn
+:
(6)
3. (Market e±ciency) p¤ ¸ 0,
Pm
i=1 x¤
ij · s¤
j, p¤
j(s¤
j ¡
Pm
i=1 x¤
ij) = 0 for all j.
The following theorem directly follows Arrow and Debreu [1].
Theorem 1. Let ui(xi; ¹ xi) be a continuous and concave function in xi 2 Rn
+ for every ¹ xi 2
R
(m¡1)n
+ , us(s;p) be a continuous and concave function in s for every p, Xi ½ Rn
+, i = 1;:::;m, and
S ½ Rn
+ be closed convex sets, and S be furthermore bounded. Then, the discretized communication
spectrum market has a competitive equilibrium.
The proof of the theorem is identical to the one given in [1] based on the Lemma of Abstract
Economy developed by Debreu [10] and Nash [21], where money is a good whose price is normalized
as 1. The only di®erence is that in [1], the utility function ui is a function of xi and nothing else.
However, the Lemma of Abstract Economy actually allows agent i's utility ui to be a function of
xi, the action made by agent i, and ¹ xi, the actions made by all other agents.
8Furthermore, if p and s are ¯xed and only Users are the agents in the game, the equilibrium
problem reduces to a Nash equilibrium problem. By allowing p and s vary in the game, we hope
to potentially achieve a more e±cient spectrum economy.
Since the Shannon utility function of (4) is continuous, concave and monotone increasing in
xi 2 Rn
+ for for every ¹ xi 2 R
(m¡1)n
+ , Our main result is the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let the power capacity provider utility us(s;p) be a continuous and concave function
in s for every p, and Xi ½ Rn
+, i = 1;:::;m, and S ½ Rn
+ be closed convex sets, and S be
furthermore bounded. Then, the discretized communication spectrum market with the Shannon
utility has a competitive equilibrium.
4 Equilibrium Characterization
For simplicity, let the power capacity set S is represented by a polyhedron
S = fs : Bs · r; s ¸ 0g
for given constraint matrix B and resource vector r, and let the power supply cost function be
linear c(s) = cTs for a given cost coe±cient vector c. Then, the optimality function of (6) is that,
there is y¤ such that
Bs¤ · r;
p¤ ¡ c · BTy¤;
rTy¤ = (p¤ ¡ c)Ts¤;
s¤;y¤ ¸ 0;
(7)
Now consider the optimality conditions of (5) where, for simplicity, let Xi = Rn
+. They are
wi ¢ rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i) · (rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i)Tx¤
i) ¢ p¤;
(p¤)Tx¤
i = wi;
x¤
i ¸ 0;
(8)
where rxiu(xi; ¹ xi) 2 Rn denotes any sub-gradient vector of u(xi; ¹ xi) with respect to xi.
The complete necessary and su±cient conditions for a competitive equilibrium can be sum-
9marized as:
wi ¢ rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i) · (rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i)Tx¤
i) ¢ p¤; 8i
Bs¤ · r;
p¤ ¡ c · BTy¤;
P
i x¤
i · s¤;
cTs¤ + rTy¤ ·
P
i wi;
x¤
i;p¤;s¤;y¤ ¸ 0; 8i:
(9)
Note that the conditions (p¤)Ts¤ = cTs¤ + rTy¤ and (p¤)Tx¤
i = wi for all i are implied by the
conditions in (9): multiplying x¤
i ¸ 0 to both sides of the ¯rst inequality, y¤ ¸ 0 to both sides of
the second inequality, s¤ ¸ 0 to both sides of the third inequality in (9), we have (p¤)Tx¤
i ¸ wi
for all i, rTy¤ ¸ (s¤)TBTy¤, and (s¤)TBTy¤ ¸ (p¤ ¡ c)Ts¤, which, together with other inequality
conditions in (9), imply
X
i
wi ¸ cTs¤ + rTy¤ ¸ (p¤)Ts¤ ¸ (p¤)T
Ã
X
i
x¤
i
!
=
X
i
(p¤)Tx¤
i ¸
X
i
wi;
that is, every inequality in the sequence must be tight, which implies (p¤)Ts¤ = cTs¤ + rTy¤,
(p¤)T(
P
i x¤
i) = (p¤)Ts¤, and (p¤)Tx¤
i = wi for all i.
Thus, we have a characterization theorem of a competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Every equilibrium of the discretized communication spectrum market with the Shannon
utility has the following properties
1. p¤ > 0 (every tone power has a price);
2.
P
i x¤
i = s¤ (produce what is needed);
3. (p¤)Ts¤ =
P
i wi (all user budgets go to the provider);
4. If x¤
ij > 0 then (rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i)Tx¤
i)¢p¤
j ¡wi¢(rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i))j = 0 for all i;j (every user only
purchases most valuable tone power).
Proof. Note that
(rxiui(xi; ¹ xi))j =
1
¾ij +
P
k6=i ai
kjxkj + xij
> 0; 8x ¸ 0:
10Thus,
wi ¢ rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i) > 0;
so that the ¯rst inequality of (9) implies that p¤ > 0.
The second property is from (p¤)T(
P
i x¤
i) = (p¤)Ts¤,
P
i x¤
i · s¤ and p¤ > 0.
The third is from (p¤)Tx¤
i = wi for all i and
P
i x¤
i = s¤.
The last one is from the complementarity condition of user optimality.
5 Equilibrium for a Weak-Interference Market
The inequalities and equalities in (9) are all linear, except the ¯rst
wi ¢ rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i) · (rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i)Tx¤
i) ¢ p¤:
Now we consider a weak-interference communication channel where the Shannon utility function is
approximated by
ui(xi; ¹ xi) =
n X
j=1
log
0
@1 +
xij
¾ij + ai
j
³P
k6=i xkj
´
1
A (10)
where ai
j represent the average of normalized crosstalk ratios for k 6= i. Furthermore, we assume
0 · ai
j · 1, that is, the average cross-interference ratio is not above 1 or it is less than the self-
interference ratio (always normalized to 1); and S = fs¤g is a singleton, that is, the power supply
s¤ is ¯xed.
The partial derivative of ui(xi; ¹ xi) to xij is
(rxiui(xi; ¹ xi))j =
1
¾ij + ai
j
³P
k6=i xkj
´
+ xij
; 8j
so that
rxiui(xi; ¹ xi)Txi =
n X
j=1
xij
¾ij + ai
j
³P
k6=i xkj
´
+ xij
:
At an equilbrium charaterized by (9),
X
k6=i
x¤
kj = s¤
j ¡ x¤
ij; 8j:
11Thus,
(rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i))j =
1
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
; 8j
so that
rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i)Txi =
n X
j=1
x¤
ij
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
:
Then, using the logarithmic transformation, one can rewrite the nonlinear inequality in (9) as
log
¡
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
¢
+log(p¤
j)+log
0
@
n X
j=1
x¤
ij
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
1
A ¸ log(wi); 8i;j: (11)
This is actually a convex inequality, since the function on the left is a (strictly) concave function
in x¤
ij and p¤
j for any constant 1 ¡ ai
j ¸ 0.
Therefore,
Theorem 3. Under the weak-interference communication channel and ¯xed power supply condition,
the competitive equilibrium set of the discretized communication spectrum market is convex.
We remark that the cooperative utility maximization approach, with the Shannon utility given
by (10) and ¯xed power supply, is still a non-convex optimization problem. However, its equilibrium
set is convex!
It's known that the convex inequality (11) admits an e±cient barrier function (see Deng et al.
[11, 5]), so that
Corollary 2. An equilibrium of the discretized communication spectrum market under the weak-
interference communication channel and ¯xed power supply condition can be computed in polynomial
time.
Complementarity Property 4 of Theorem 2 implies
log
¡
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
¢
+ log(p¤
j) + log
0
@
n X
j=1
x¤
ij
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
1
A = log(wi); 8x¤
ij > 0:
Let [(x¤)1;(p¤)1] and [(x¤)2;(p¤)2] be two distinct equilibrium points, then Theorem 3 implies that
[0:5(x¤)1 + 0:5(x¤)2;s¤;0:5(p¤)1 + 0:5(p¤)2] is also an equilibrium, so that
log
¡
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)(0:5(x¤)1
ij + 0:5(x¤)2
ij)
¢
+ log
¡
0:5(p¤)1
j + 0:5(p¤)2
j
¢
+
12log
0
@
n X
j=1
0:5(x¤)1
ij + 0:5(x¤)2
ij
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)(0:5(x¤)1
ij + 0:5(x¤)2
ij)
1
A = log(wi); 8maxf(x¤)1
ij;(x¤)2
ijg > 0:
However, the function on the left is strictly concave in p¤, and in x¤ if ai
j < 1, so that
log
¡
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)(0:5(x¤)1
ij + 0:5(x¤)2
ij)
¢
+ log
¡
0:5(p¤)1
j + 0:5(p¤)2
j
¢
+
log
0
@
n X
j=1
0:5(x¤)1
ij + 0:5(x¤)2
ij
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)(0:5(x¤)1
ij + 0:5(x¤)2
ij)
1
A >
0:5
0
@log(¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)(x¤)1
ij) + log((p¤)1
j) + log
0
@
n X
j=1
(x¤)1
ij
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)(x¤)1
ij
)
1
A
1
A+
0:5
0
@log(¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)(x¤)2
ij) + log((p¤)2
j) + log
0
@
n X
j=1
(x¤)2
ij
¾ij + ai
js¤
j + (1 ¡ ai
j)(x¤)2
ij
)
1
A
1
A ¸
0:5log(wi) + 0:5log(wi) = log(wi); 8maxf(x¤)1
ij;(x¤)2
ijg > 0:
Thus, we must have (p¤)1 = (p¤)2 > 0, and (x¤)1
ij = (x¤)2
ij; 8maxf(x¤)1
ij;(x¤)2
ijg > 0 if ai
j < 1,
which imply that the equilibrium point is unique.
Therefore,
Theorem 4. Under the weak-interference communication channel and ¯xed power supply condi-
tion, the competitive price equilibrium of the discretized communication spectrum market is unique.
Moreover, if the crosstalk ratio ai
j is strictly less than 1, then the power allocation x¤
ij is also unique.
6 The Spectrum Trading Market
Unlike the market described above where each user is equipped with an endowed \monetary"
budget, in the spectrum trading market each user is endowed with a bundle of allocated spectrum
power, say wi 2 Rn, where each entry represents the power allocation for user i on channel or
tone j, j = 1;:::;n. Now they trade their spectrum power under a market price to maximize their
individual utility function. Here, the total spectrum power capacities available on the market are
¹ s =
m X
i=1
wi;
and they are ¯xed.
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[x¤
1;:::;x¤
m;p¤], where p¤ = (p¤
1;:::;p¤
n) 2 Rn
+ and p¤
j is the unit price on tone j; such that
1. (User optimality) x¤
i, i = 1;:::;m, is a maximizer of
maximize xi ui(xi; ¹ x¤
i)
subject to
Pn
j=1 p¤
jxij · wT
i p¤
xi ¸ 0;
(12)
2. (Market e±ciency) p¤ ¸ 0,
Pm
i=1 x¤
ij · ¹ sj and p¤
j(¹ sj ¡
Pm
i=1 x¤
ij) = 0 for all j.
Note that (12) is homogeneous in p¤, so that if p¤ is an equilibrium price vector, so is ® ¢ p¤ for
any positive multiplier ®.
Again, following the theorem of Arrow and Debreu [1], we have:
Corollary 3. The trading spectrum market with the Shannon utility has a competitive equilibrium.
From the optimality conditions of (12):
(wT
i p¤) ¢ rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i) · (rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i)Tx¤
i) ¢ p¤;
(p¤)Tx¤
i = wT
i p¤;
x¤
i ¸ 0;
(13)
we can derive the complete necessary and su±cient conditions for a competitive equilibrium:
(wT
i p¤) ¢ rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i) · (rxiui(x¤
i; ¹ x¤
i)Tx¤
i) ¢ p¤; 8i
P
i x¤
i · ¹ s;
x¤
i;p¤ ¸ 0; 8i:
(14)
Note that the condition (p¤)Tx¤
i = wT
i p¤ for all i is implied by the conditions in (14): multiplying
x¤
i ¸ 0 to both sides of the ¯rst inequality, we have (p¤)Tx¤
i ¸ wT
i p¤ for all i, which imply
X
i
wT
i p¤ ·
X
i
(p¤)Tx¤
i · (p¤)T¹ s =
X
i
wT
i p¤;
that is, every inequality in the sequence must be tight, which implies (p¤)Tx¤
i = wT
i p¤ for all i and
P
i x¤
i = ¹ s.
Similarly, we have a characterization theorem of a competitive equilibrium.
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following properties
1. p¤ > 0 (every tone power has a price);
2.
P
i x¤
i = ¹ s (all power endowments are traded).
3. If the equilibrium allocation has a property that each tone is occupied by a single user, then
the Shannon utility at the equilibrium is improved for every user (trading bene¯ts every one).
The proof of the last statement is based on the fact that, for every i,
ui(x¤
i;0) ¸ ui(x¤
i; ¹ wi) ¸ ui(wi; ¹ wi);
where the ¯rst inequality is from that there is no interference at the equilibrium and the second
inequality holds since wi is a feasible solution for (12) at the corresponding equilibrium price p¤.
Under the same weak-interference communication channel condition and using the logarithmic
transformation, one can rewrite the nonlinear inequality in (14) as
log
¡
¾ij + ai
j¹ sj + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
¢
+ log(p¤
j) + log
0
@
n X
j=1
x¤
ij
¾ij + ai
j¹ sj + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
1
A ¸ log(wT
i p¤); 8i;j:
(15)
This is not a convex inequality, since the function on the right is a concave function in p¤.
However, from Theorem 5 we can de¯ne log(p¤
j) = y¤
j for all j. Then, the above inequality
becomes
log
¡
¾ij + ai
j¹ sj + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
¢
+ y¤
j + log
0
@
n X
j=1
x¤
ij
¾ij + ai
j¹ sj + (1 ¡ ai
j)x¤
ij
1
A ¸ log(
X
j
wije
y¤
j); 8i;j:
This is now a convex inequality, since the function on the left is a (strictly) concave function in x¤
ij
and y¤
j for any constant 1¡ai
j ¸ 0, and the one on the right is a convex function in y¤. Therefore,
Theorem 6. Under the weak-interference communication channel condition, the competitive equi-
librium set of the spectrum trading market is log convex (convex in allocation and log price), and
an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
157 Equilibrium under the Frequency Division Multiple Access pol-
icy
For continuous communication spectrum management under the Frequency Division Multiple Ac-
cess policy or even multiple users sharing a same tone but operating at di®erent time point (that is,
at any given time period, only one user utilizes the tone), each user's utility function is independent
of other users, that is,
ui(xi) =
n X
j=1
log
µ
1 +
xij
¾ij
¶
(16)
Then, similar to the discussion in the previous section, one can rewrite the nonlinear inequality
in (9) as
log
¡
¾ij + x¤
ij
¢
+ log(p¤
j) + log
0
@
n X
j=1
x¤
ij
¾ij + x¤
ij
1
A ¸ log(wi); 8i;j; (17)
or (14) as
log
¡
¾ij + x¤
ij
¢
+ log(p¤
j) + log
0
@
n X
j=1
x¤
ij
¾ij + x¤
ij
1
A ¸ log(wT
i p¤); 8i;j: (18)
Again, this is a convex or log-convex inequality. Therefore,
Theorem 7. Under the FDMA or single-user-single-frequency at any time period policy, the com-
petitive equilibrium of the discretized communication spectrum market or the spectrum trading mar-
ket is unique, and it can be computed in polynomial time.
For a single frequency j with multiple users x¤
ij > 0, one can implement an online or real time
policy on tone j by a randomized algorithm by assigning user i with probability
x¤
ij P
k x¤
kj
at any time
period or when multiple users request services on tone j.
8 An Illustration Example
Consider two channels f1 and f2 and two users x and y; each of them have a physical power budget
b1 = b2 = 1. Let the Shannon utility function for x be
log(1 +
x1
1 + y1
) + log(1 +
x2
4 + y2
)
16and one for user y be
log(1 +
y1
2 + x1
) + log(1 +
y2
4 + x2
);
and let the aggregate social utility be the sum of the two individual user utilities.
Clearly, the Nash equilibrium is x1 = y1 = 1 and x2 = y2 = 0, where the social utility has
value 0:3010.
The cooperative social solution is x1 = y2 = 1 and x2 = y1 = 0, where the social utility has
value 0:3979, but it is not individually optimal for user y.
Now consider a competitive spectrum market with power supply for two channels s1 = s2 =
b1 + b2 = 2 and the initial endowments for two users wx = wy = 1. Then the unique competitive
equilibrium point is
p¤
1 = 3=5 and p¤
2 = 2=5;
x¤
1 = 5=3 and x¤
2 = 0;
y¤
1 = 1=3 and y¤
2 = 2;
with the social utility value 0:566. However, the social utility value of the Nash equilibrium with
the same physical power budget b1 = 5=3 and b2 = 7=3 has value 0:4657.
Even we simply scale the spectrum allocation for the competitive market equilibrium to
x¤
1 = 1; x¤
2 = 0; y¤
1 = 1=7; y¤
2 = 6=7
Such that each user is allocated exactly 1 unit physical power. Then, this allocation still has a
social utility value 0:3775 that is much higher than that at the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, if we adjust the initial endowment to wx = 6=5 and wy = 4=5, then the equilib-
rium price will remain the same and the unique equilibrium allocation will be
x¤
1 = 2; x¤
2 = 0; y¤
1 = 0; y¤
2 = 2:
Upon scaling, we obtain the socially optimal allocation. In other words, the exogenous factors w
and s of the spectrum market can be further adjusted to achieve a better social solution while
maintaining individual satisfaction under the open market equilibrium price.
17Now, consider the spectrum trading market where the initial power endowment for users x
and y are given as
wx =
2
3
¢
0
@ 1
1
1
A and wy =
1
3
¢
0
@ 1
1
1
A;
respectively. Thus, we have total one unit power in each tone in the trading market. The unique
equilibrium point is
p¤
1 = 2 and p¤
2 = 1;
x¤
1 = 1 and x¤
2 = 0;
y¤
1 = 0 and y¤
2 = 1:
Basically, user x have exchanged its 2=3 unit power in tone 2 for 1=3 unit power in tone 1 of user
y. User x's utility value increased from 0:2382 to 0:3010, and user y's utility value increased from
0:0811 to 0:0969.
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